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Abstract

rules established by the European Economic Community [38, 39]. Increasing automation of data management using computer systems invariably means that
these privacy rules become requirements for software
systems that manage data affected by privacy rules.
Analyzing conformance to these rules requires careful
comparison of the ‘privacy API’ of a computer system
with the (typically informal) regulatory rule sets. This
paper develops a technique for bridging the gap between regulatory rule sets and specifications that are
precise enough to be implemented without ambiguity
and formal enough to be analyzed by automatic means
for the criteria that stakeholders for the regulatory rule
sets care about.
A variety of efforts have been made to develop
languages for expressing rules for privacy. However,
there have been few practical case studies for these approaches and there remain many questions about exactly which features are really needed. We examinee
this issue from the bottom up by taking a practical regulatory rule set, the HIPAA consent rules, and explore
whether anything beyond techniques developed almost
3 decades ago are required to express them. In particular, we ask whether the HIPAA consent rules can
be expressed using a basic set of access control matrix
operations from the classic access control systems literature. We find that this is not possible directly, but
we identify a modest set of extensions that are capable
of expressing the complete rule set. Our extensions require us to add explicit operations for notification and
logging and to cover conditions and obligations that
typically cannot be directly verified by a computer. In
addition, it is important for purposes of readability and
textual accuracy to include certain binding constructs
to reflect legal phrasing where terms in one clause are
taken to be ‘as in’ another clause. With these few additions we are able to describe sets of rules which we
call privacy APIs that are capable of expressing the
HIPAA rules with such precision that we are able to en-

There is a growing interest in establishing rules to regulate the privacy of citizens in the treatment of sensitive
personal data such as medical and financial records. Such
rules must be respected by software used in these sectors.
The regulatory statements are somewhat informal and must
be interpreted carefully in the software interface to private
data. This paper describes techniques to formalize regulatory privacy rules and how to exploit this formalization to
analyze the rules automatically. Our formalism, which we
call privacy APIs, is an extension of access control matrix
operations to include (1) operations for notification and logging and (2) constructs that ease the mapping between legal
and formal language. We validate the expressive power of
privacy APIs by encoding the 2000 and 2003 HIPAA consent rules in our system. This formalization is then encoded
into Promela and we validate the usefulness of the formalism by using the SPIN model checker to verify properties
that distinguish the two versions of HIPAA.
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Introduction

An increasing number of government agencies and
enterprises are finding a need to write down privacy
rules for their handling of personal information of parties who entrust such information to them. These
rules are derived from a complex set of requirements
laid down by diverse stakeholders; they are often
complex and may contain important ambiguities and
unexpected consequences. Examples include sectorspecific rules like the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) [41] and Gramm-LeachBliley Act [20] in the US and comprehensive privacy
∗ In:
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code them in a modelling language (Promela) and use a
model checker (SPIN) to demonstrate consequences of
the rule sets of the kind that concerned key stakeholders enough to precipitate rule changes from one version
to the next.
The value of this contribution is two-fold. First, we
are able to set a baseline of constructs sufficient to provide a formalization of practical rules that can be read
by a human. This aids readers in determining conformance of the encoding to the informal regulatory rules
on the one hand and the software on the other hand.
Second, we are able to provide a formalization that can
be used for automated analysis to explore consequences
of the rule set that may be surprising and undesirable.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2 we present background on access control and
define auditable privacy systems. In Section 3 we describe privacy APIs. In Section 4 we present a study
of the HIPAA consent requirements. In Section 5 we
show our formal model, queries, and results. In Section
6 we discuss related work. We conclude in Section 7.

2

Legal policy about the extent of ORCON rights that
people have over information about them varies by
country and area of law. The laws that we discuss
in this work give a weak level of control to the data
subject, the principal that an object is “about,” and a
stronger level of control to the data
One of the early models for access control systems is
the HRU model. Rules in the language are transactionstyle commands that execute in sequence on a single
system. The model uses a single access control matrix
to store the state of the system. Primitive operations
of the system manage the reading and writing of rights
and the creation and deletion of principals and objects
in the matrix. Commands consist of (optional) conditions and a series of primitive operations that are
executed transactionally. The policy of a system is the
set of commands that the system publishes. Since the
policy of the system is determined by the functionality of the full set of commands, in order to validate
the properties of the system, the full set of commands
must be analyzed and verified.
We can view a system’s command set in the idiom
of an interface or API (application programmers interface). Since the access control matrix is only accessible
through the commands we can focus on the verification
of the commands to gain confidence in the safety of the
system as a whole.

Background

In this work, we use the style of commands introduced by Harrison, Ruzzo, and Ullman (HRU) [30] to
create a formalism we call an auditable privacy system
and use it to let us better understand and verify legal
privacy requirements. In this section we describe the
properties of the classic HRU model, define auditable
privacy systems, and describe the limitations of the
classic HRU model in directly modelling them.

2.1

2.2

Auditable Privacy System

We extend the theory and formal Privacy System of
Gunter, et al. [28] with auditing to produce an auditable
privacy system. The basic events of an auditable privacy system are:
Transfer. Transferring an object by copying it and
passing the copy to the recipient’s domain. Objects
may be transferred with or without ORCON restrictions.
Action. Using a private object for some purpose.
Uses include low level events like read and write as well
as scenario based events such as treatment for medical
needs and billing for services. Often we need a method
of auditing what actions occurred and for what purpose.
Creation. The addition of new objects or principals
to the system and access control matrix. Principals
may create new objects about themselves or other others if authorized. Often we require a method of auditing the creation of objects and principals.
Rights Establishment. A subject or owner of an object granting or revoking permissions on it to principals, roles, or groups of principals.
Notification. An obligation to inform concerned

Access Control and HRU

There are two general types of access control policies, discretionary access control (DAC) and mandatory access control (MAC). In DAC policies, an object’s
owner has control over which permissions are granted
to others. In MAC policies, policy rules determine permissions and access to objects, normally without the
input of the owner.
Originator Control (ORCON) policies [26] are a special kind of MAC that give rights to the originators
of system objects even if those objects are no longer
owned by them. For example, if Alice creates a file
and Bob makes a copy of it, only Alice can grant new
permissions on Bob’s copy, even if Bob modifies it. The
policy is mandatory since the system, not Bob, determines how the originator designation is assigned. The
ORCON idiom is commonly used for policies where one
principal holds or collects another principal’s information.
2

principals about events performed by other principals
in the system. It is commonly imposed as an enforcement mechanism where system level verification is not
sufficient.
Logging. An obligation on the system to track
events–both those that succeed and those that fail. It
is used for system verification and auditing.
We call a system that includes all the above
events and obligations, that includes both run time
and post-hoc auditing of the behavior of principals and the transfer of objects through domains, an Auditable Privacy System.
We use
the six primitive operations from the HRU model:
enter r into (p, o) and delete r from (p, o) for rights
establishment; create principal p, create object o,
destroy principal p, and destroy object o for creation. Their semantics are given in HRU’s original paper [30] and reproduced in Appendix B for reference.
We add two primitive operations: inform p of t for
notification; and log t for logging. Transfer is accomplished by creating a new object and inserting the old
object’s content.
Since an auditable privacy system is ORCON based
and considers objects being “about” its subject and
created by its originator, we need the following nonprimitive commands that layer over the primitive operations:
command
and
and
end
command
if
and
then
and
and
end

2.3

mand.
Second, there are no roles or groups in the classic
HRU system. Policies often define rules in terms of
roles so omitting that functionality makes maintaining
permissions significantly more complex.
Third, the commands in the HRU system are restricted to conditions and primitive operations that
affect the state of the access control matrix, greatly
limiting the power of the commands that we can write.
We would like to include environment based conditions
and operations that include logging and notification.
Fourth, in order to enforce ORCON policies we need
to create non-primitive operations that act as an interface to the primitive operations. These operations
enforce the MAC properties of the system by acting
as an interface to the system. The HRU model does
not allow commands to invoke other commands, so this
functionality must be added.
Finally, since the commands are limited to reading
and modification of the access control matrix, there is
no way to include outside obligations in the commands.
These shortcomings require us to modify the classic
HRU model in the following ways.
First, we give each command an implicit argument
called actor which is assigned the value of the actor in
a command. We thereby rely on the system’s authentication for identifying the actor in a command.
Second, we use groups to provide rudimentary roles.
Each group is an object in the system and principals
have permission member on it if they are members of
the group. We do not handle the general trust management issue since it is not needed here. Some roles
indicate affiliations or relationships between principals,
so in those cases we place indicative permissions in the
matrix as appropriate (e.g. Alice has relationship doctor on Bob).
Third, we add a global append-only log and a mechanism for informing principals of events that occur in
the system, the two outside operations needed for auditable privacy systems.
Fourth, we allow commands to invoke other commands and hide some primitive operations. This enables us to write commands that function as an interface to the underlying access control matrix.
Finally, we discern two kinds of obligations: (1)
obligations that the computer system can perform or
verify and (2) obligations that the computer system
can not perform or verify. For the first type, the computer system performs the obligation or validates that
the obligation is performed before the command completes. We address the second type in the next section.
By making the above adaptations we have a model
that can fully implement auditable privacy systems.

CreateObject (a, s, o)
create object o
enter originator in (a, o)
enter subject in (s, o)
CopyObject (a, s, o, o0 )
originator in (a, o)
subject in (s, o)
create object o0
enter originator in (a, o0 )
enter subject in (s, o0 )

Limitations of the HRU model

While the HRU model gives the tools to model commands that affect the access control matrix, by itself it
has shortcomings in implementing an auditable privacy
system.
First, there is no baked-in notion of the initiator (actor) of a command. Commands may take arguments,
one of which can be designated for the actor, but there
is no primitive in the system supporting this or providing authentication. This is important because privacy
policies normally predicate rules on the actor in a com3

We use auditable privacy systems to underly privacy
APIs, which we define next.

3

visible to the system specification [27]. The system
specification needs assurance that the environmental
variables are correct, however, so we must create a
bridge between them. Flags accomplish this by allowing principals to make assertions about the environment that the computer system can check to impose
outside conditions and obligations. The flags can be
tied to particular principals in the system (e.g. patient
gives a consent form that is signed and dated) or be
non-principal-specific conditions (e.g. disclosure document reserves the right to change).
In our model implementation, when the model can
not perform or verify a condition or obligation, it must
either (1) allow the command and set a flag that indicates an obligation must be fulfilled, (2) look for an
assertion that the required obligation has already been
fulfilled, or (3) forbid the execution until an authorized principal authorizes it. The third case is similar
to adding another condition to the command and removing the hindering condition, so we deal with it in
that manner. The first and second cases are handled
with environment flags. The second case finds parallels
in legislative policies which use post-hoc auditing and
notification for enforcement. Conditions of the last two
types are an if condition which both returns a boolean
and a checks or returns an obligation with flags. We
call such a condition an if with obligation, or OIF.

Privacy APIs

Legal privacy rules are complex natural language
documents written by a large group of people. Their
length and complexity often make them prohibitively
difficult to understand. However, by observing a similarity between legal privacy policies and APIs we can
gain some traction.
Both APIs and legal privacy policies publish a set of
allowed command combinations (procedures) to access
a database of protected information (system state) and
disallow all others. Verification consists of checking
that each procedure is safe and that no combination of
procedures will lead to a disallowed state.
Using this similarity, we convert legal privacy policies to access control rules that are an interface to a
set of private information. The set of procedures that
we derive from a legal policy document is its privacy
API which we formally define below. The policy goals
are the system invariants. We can use formal methods
tools such as model checking to explore the states of
the system and verify that the privacy API enforces
the system invariants.
The invariants of a legal privacy policy are a function
of the influences of stakeholders involved in its design.
Each stakeholder’s invariants reflect its ideals which are
often in conflict with other stakeholders. Policy writers
design a system that satisfies some of the invariants of
each, hopefully creating a reasonable amalgam.
Stakeholders can use their ideals to define a tailored
set of invariants that lets them find the relative acceptability of a policy as it evolves. When a policy
changes, they evaluate whether the new system is more
or less acceptable. We can use the privacy API model
to streamline that evaluation.
Since legal privacy policies give rules for the interaction of users and information, they normally include
conditions and obligations that a computer system can
not perform or verify. In some cases, the conditions
and obligations require an expert to evaluate properly
(e.g. when deciding if a purpose is reasonable). They
are part of the requirements, events that the system
specification can not observe, so we must treat them
differently in our model. Our model verifies and enforces what it can and for the rest it relies on the environment. By factoring out unenforceable conditions
and obligations, we achieve a model that is easier to
design and verify.
From a more theoretical view, outside conditions
and obligations are environment variables that are in-

Example: The following is a selection from the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB) financial services
privacy [20] requirements [15 USC Subchapter 1
§6802(b)(1)(B)]: “A financial institution may not disclose nonpublic personal information to a nonaffiliated
third party unless . . . (B) the consumer is given the
opportunity, before the time that such information is
initially disclosed, to direct that such information not
be disclosed to such third party;”
Using our adapted HRU syntax1 we translate the
quote as follows. Note that since GLB includes ORCON restrictions [15 USC Subchapter 1 §6802(c)], we use
the ORCON CopyObject command.
COM
if
and
and
and
and
then
and
end

Disclose(a, s, r, f, p, ev)
“third party disclose” in p
affiliated not in (a, r)
member in (s, consumer group)
“consumer given chance to opt-out”
in ev
opt-out not in (s, r)
CopyObject (a, s, f, f0 )
enter own in (r, f0 )

1 In this work we use the following abbreviations for parameters: (a)ctor, (s)ubject, (r)ecipient, (f)ile, (p)urpose, (ev)idence.
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Alice executes the above command, trying to disclose a file F about Sam, a consumer, to Rick, a nonaffiliated third party. First the command checks that
the purpose is for a third party disclosure. Then, if
it finds that affiliated 6∈ M [Alice, Rick], that Sam is
a member of consumer group, that environmental
flag consumer given opportunity to opt-out is asserted true, and that opt-out 6∈ M [Sam, Rick], it does
an ORCON copy of F to create F0 and transfers the
new copy to the ownership of Rick.
¤

The system requirements for the HIPAA privacy
rules contain many low level requirements, for example
rules regarding the placement of computer terminals
and password management. Our model abstracts away
such low level issues and so has only the following system requirements: each principal in the system has a
unique name and is authenticated; there is a database
of private records in which each file is associated with
its subject; the computer system has access to the date
and time; the computer system has can test boolean
equality, string equality, and test for the presence of
an item in a set; the computer system has an append
only log; the system has a method of notifying principals when needed. This abstraction lets us focus on the
functionality of the law’s access control requirements,
those that govern the disclosure and use of private information.
We translate the English rules into the modified
HRU syntax but preserve the original structure of the
policy. Each paragraph or clause in the law is translated into one or more commands. The reference structure of clauses is preserved by allowing commands to
call other commands in a function-like manner. Complex conditions that may be referenced by multiple
clauses or rules are translated as if commands (or
“AsIn” commands since their titles normally contain
that phrase) that may be called by other if commands
and can return true or false. We discuss the need for
this below in section 4.3.
As noted above, the consent rule was considerably
rewritten between the two versions that we considered,
so the two rule sets vary considerably in length. The
2000 version rule set contains 5 helper commands and
60 regular and if commands, all local to [§164.506].
There are 26 environmental evidence flags included.
The 2003 version rule set contains 5 helper commands
and 54 regular and if commands with 21 of them local
to [§164.506] and 33 of them non-local. There are 74
environmental evidence flags included.
HIPAA
requires
that
events
be
logged
[164.308(a)(ii)(D), v.2003].
This requires a system
to audit events logs, so all commands in the system
must perform an implicit logging operation. For
conciseness, however, our verification model only
records events that other commands later look for.

We can use our model to translate larger sections of
legal privacy policies, giving a large set of commands
and conditions.
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Translating HIPAA Consent

Part of the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [41] is a Privacy Rule which
governs the management, storage, and distribution of
patient health information. Since hospital electronic
health care records systems are normally complex and
often nonuniform, assuring compliance with the rule is
hard. Health care entities are required by law to have a
Privacy Officer in charge of enforcing compliance with
the rule, so hospital administrators and staff need not
learn the details of the rule. Instead they are trained
in the basics while specialized health care software enforces the access control rules.
Our goal is to provide a model to let policy writers
and enforcers better understand allowed flows of information, allow comparisons between versions of the
law, and allow verification of the law’s intended invariants. To do this, we translate a section of HIPAA
rules into auditable privacy system commands and use
formal methods model checking tools to verify properties of the system. We study the rules about patient
consent for treatment, payment, and health care operations.

4.1

Consent

The rules about when health care entities must get
patient consent before performing treatment, payment,
and health care operations activities [§164.506] were the
subject of debate during the development of HIPAA.
The version of the rules from 2000 [23] contains many
provisions and exceptions, so the rules are about one
page long. The later version of the rules from 2003 [25]
was simplified, so it is only about one third of a page
long. For this study, we translate both versions of
the consent rules and use a model checker to perform
queries that explore their differences.

4.2

Translation Methodology

In our translation, we strove to stay as close to the
structure of the text as possible. To this end, we designed a methodology which made translation straightforward and observably close to the text.
Each paragraph in the text has one or more com5

mands that execute it. Paragraphs are translated into
multiple commands when they allow or deny multiple
actions (e.g. use and disclose). A paragraph has at
most one if command (AsIn) which includes or references all the conditions needed for the paragraph. The
result is a rule set whose size is linear in the number of
paragraphs.
When paragraphs reference each other, whether directly or implicitly, we locate and translate the referenced clause and include an explicit call to it.
Parent paragraphs that refer to their children include their children as references. Where appropriate,
child paragraphs have their own commands. A child
paragraph may reference its own specific AsIn, its parent’s AsIn, or both.
Each condition or obligation in a paragraph is included in the paragraph’s AsIn. If the condition or
obligation is unrelated to access control (e.g. [§164.520]
which has typographic rules for privacy practices disclosures documents) then it is checked as an environmental flag. We follow the language of the text, so
unless two conditions or obligations are phrased very
similarly or have obviously the same intent they have
separate flags. The number of environment flags included in each model is dependent on the writing style
of each paragraph.
One of the most important factors in deciding
whether a request should be permitted or denied is
the purpose for the request. Some requests may be
made for more than one purpose, so we provide each
command with a list of purposes. Commands receive
a purpose set as a parameter so the set can be passed
on to other commands that may be referenced. We use
this method because it is similar to the textual style–
paragraphs and clauses are divided and parameterized
by purpose.

4.3

referenced procedure. Because this is not a common
programming language idiom, we implement it by dividing each paragraph into two parts: an if command
(AsIn) which contains the conditions and one or more
regular commands that reference the associated AsIn.
This separation allows us to keep the reference structure of the law.
Legal references also vary in specificity. Most are unambiguous, but some are global pointers that refer to a
large body of law. For example, [§164.520(b)(3), v.2000]
“Except when required by law, a material change to
any term. . . ” is a deference to any other relevant legal requirement. We deal with this and other kinds of
ambiguous references by creating an environmental assertion that the condition is satisfied. Non-monotonic
default logic (for example, [4]) could perhaps be used
here instead.
The second distinguishing feature is the use of testimonials in resolving conditions. Many environmental
conditions are resolved by a testimonial from a principal in the system. For example, [§164.506(a)(3)(c),
v.2000] “If . . . the covered health care provider determines, in the exercise of professional judgment, that
the individual’s consent to receive treatment is clearly
inferred from the circumstances.” Our model handles
testimonials in the same way that it handles other environmental conditions, but an implementation must
track the testimonials that allowed a command to execute and log who asserted them.
To illustrate the translation, we give an example
paragraph and the regular and if commands that we
derive.
Example: Section [§164.506(c)(1), v.2003] reads:
“(c) Implementation specifications: Treatment, payment, or health care operations. (1) A covered entity
may use or disclose protected health information for its
own treatment, payment, or health care operations.”
We separate the purpose (only for its own usage) of
the paragraph into an if command:

Challenges in Translation

It is not surprising that legal privacy policies differ
in style from standard computer systems access control
policies, but two common features we came upon made
the distinction very sharp.
The first distinguishing feature is the way that references are used. Commonly, a paragraph refers to
the conditions of another paragraph independent of its
body. For example, [§164.506(a), v.2003] “Except with
respect to uses or disclosures that require an authorization under [§164.508(a)(2)]” is a condition that points to
the conditions of the referenced paragraph, but does
not intend to activate the functionality of it. This is
akin to a procedure creating a condition out of the precondition of another procedure without executing the

OIF
if
and
then
else
end

AllowedAsIn506c1 (a, s, r, p, f, ev)
“own use” in p
isTPO(p)
return true
return false

The quote contains six permissions: use and disclose for treatment, payment, and health care operations. We create two commands, Use506c1 and Disclose506c1, parameterized by purpose.
6

COM
if
and
and
and
then
end

pendix A for a brief background for readers unfamiliar
with Promela.
1active proctype Use506c1(){
2 bool result = false, temp;
3 do
4 ::Use506c1 chan?request( ) ->
5 AllowedAsIn506c1 chan!request(true);
6 AllowedAsIn506c1 chan?response(temp);
7 result = temp && (r==a);
8 result=result&&(m.mat[a].obj[f].own==1);
9 if
10
:: result ->
11
EnterUse chan!request(true);
12
EnterUse chan?response(temp);
13
:: else -> skip;
14 fi;
15 Use506c1 chan!response(result);
16 od}

Use506c1 (a, s, r, p, f, ev)
AllowedAsIn506c1 (a, s, r, p, f, ev)
r == a
own in (a, f)
isTPO(p)
EnterUse(a, p, f)

Use506c1 checks the paragraph’s if command, that
the recipient of the information is the actor, and that
the actor owns the file. Own means that the file is
locally visible to the actor. This condition is implicit
in the legal text, that a covered entity can only look at
files that it has locally.
CopyObject, isTPO, and EnterDisclose are
helper commands.
CopyObject is given above.
isTPO returns true if the purpose set provided includes treatment, payment, or health care operations.
EnterUse inspects the purpose set for treatment, payment, and health care operations and inserts the appropriate permission in the matrix. EnterDisclose is
similar. Disclose506c1 and the helper commands are
provided in Appendix C.
¤
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The process listens for request messages with a single boolean. When a message appears, line 4 executes.
Line 5 transmits a request to AllowedAsIn506c1 to
check the conditions. When AllowedAsIn506c1 responds, it assigns the response value to temp. Lines
7–8 checks that the recipient is the actor and that the
actor owns the file. Lines 9–14 check the result. If the
result is true, EnterUse is requested to update the
permissions. Use506c1 finishes and sends its result on
lines 15–16.
¤

Analysis

After translating the section of legal text into commands, we convert the commands into a format suitable for input to a standard model checker. With
it we can define invariants and evaluate whether the
command set respects them. We use the Spin model
checker (www.spinroot.com) although other similar
tools could have been used instead. Spin’s input language is Promela, a C-like language.
The translation to Promela is straightforward from
our command syntax. Each command is converted into
a process which listens and responds along a named
public channel. A globally readable record (evidence)
contains a bit flag for each environmental flag. A similar record (purpose) contains a bit flag for each purpose value. Global variables hold the values of the
command’s actor (a), subject (s), intended recipient
(r), purpose (p), and file (f). The access matrix m is a
two dimensional array with principals in rows and all
system objects (principals, files, and group objects) as
columns. Each entry in the array is a record with a
bit flag for each possible permission. Processes refer to
each other and communicate by passing messages over
their named channels. The model executes as a single
thread. We do not use concurrency.

We next show how we can perform queries on our
model using Spin.
We are interested in queries that legislators, lawyers,
and interested parties would normally perform by
hand. We want to ask queries such as “Does this loophole exist in the law?” and “Can this command execute
before that?” When the result of a query violates the
invariant of a stakeholder, we call it a relative stakeholder problem. The context of a query is important
as is the set of procedures that are active for the test.
Such queries may not need a large number of steps to
be answered, but they are interesting because the one
asking may not be able to look at the text directly due
to its length or complexity.
In order to find interesting queries to perform, we
examined the different HIPAA consent policies and the
summary of public comments that motivated the policy changes between 2000 and 2003. The comments
document [24] contains a short list of concerns that
interested parties found in the 2000 document. Some
items on the list are relative stakeholder problems, so
other stakeholders might not consider them to be concerns. Others are concerns in that they forbid what is
common industry practice.

Example: To illustrate the Promela model, we give
an example process, Use506c1 shown above. See Ap7

The 2003 policy was written with the comments in
mind, but it is not clear if the new policy solved all of
the concerns. To answer that question, we take the expert discovered concerns, “discover” them in the 2000
version, and find out whether they are still present in
the 2003 version. We selected the following three concerns for this test:
(1) Emergency medical providers were concerned
that the requirement that they attempt to obtain consent as soon as reasonably practicable after an emergency would have required significant efforts which
might have been viewed by patients as harassing, because these providers typically do not have ongoing relationships with patients.
(2) Providers that are required by law to treat
were concerned about the mixed messages to patients
and interference with the physician-patient relationship that would have resulted because they would have
had to ask for consent to use or disclose protected
health information for treatment, payment, or health
care operations, but could have used or disclosed the
information for such purposes even if the patient said
no.
(3) The transition provisions would have resulted in
significant operational problems and the inability to
access health records would have had an adverse effect
on quality activities because many providers were not
required to obtain consent for treatment, payment, or
health care operations.
We translate the above concerns to the following
queries. They are designed to discover the concern
in the 2000 version and check whether they return
the same result in the 2003 version. (1) Are emergency providers required to obtain patient consent patients for treatment, payment, or health care operations (TPO) after the fact? (2) Can a doctor access
a patient record for TPO after the patient has denied
consent? (3) Can a doctor see a patient record for TPO
without consent in a non-emergency situation?
We evaluate the queries by first setting the initial
state of the 2000 model to have appropriate invariants,
principals, files, and permissions to discover the concern and then using the same initial state in the 2003
model to see if it yields the same result. As an example, we present the setup and invariant for the second
query

m.mat[Dan].obj[health care provider group].member = 1;
m.mat[Paula].obj[file1].subject = 1;
m.mat[Dan].obj[file1].own = 1;
m.mat[Dan].obj[Paula].required = 1;

Paula then denies Dan consent for TPO on file1.
a = Paula; s = Paula; f = file1; r = Dan;
denyConsent506b4i chan!request(true);
denyConsent506b4i chan?response( );

We then set the purpose flags in the purpose set p.
There also are a large set of evidence flags that are set
which we skip here for brevity.
p.treatment=1; p.payment=1;
p.healthcare operations=1;

Then we check an invariant to see if Dan can get
access to file1 for TPO. We also check f new which
would be the index of a new copy of file1 that Dan
could perhaps gain access to through a disclosure.
invariant = (m.mat[Dan].obj[file1].treat==0)
&&(m.mat[Dan].obj[file1].pay==0)&&
(m.mat[Dan].obj[file1].healthops==0)&&
(m.mat[Dan].obj[f new].treat==0)&&
(m.mat[Dan].obj[f new].pay ==0) &&
(m.mat[Dan].obj[f new].healthops==0);
assert(invariant==1);

We then allow Spin to non-deterministically execute
commands, non-deterministically changing the actor
and recipient variables each time. After each command
completes, we evaluate and check the invariant.
¤
Spin found the first query to be true in the 2000
version as expected. Since there is no notion of after
the fact consent in the 2003 version, the model checker
couldn’t evaluate the query, a trivial false.
Spin found the second query to be true for the
2000 model, but surprisingly returned true for the 2003
model as well. Upon inspection we found that there
was a provision in the (current) 2003 rules stating that
even though consent is not required for treatment, payment, or health care operations, health care entities
optionally may request consent anyway [164.506(b)(1),
v.2003]. No paragraph in the section declares that an
optional consent is binding, however. To find out what
this omission meant, we consulted with the Lauren Steinfeld, Privacy Officer of the University of Pennsylvania. Ms. Steinfeld remarked that a situation of denial
of an optional consent request for TPO is legally complex because it has a conflict of patient expectations
of privacy and potential medical necessity. In practice,
this case may be affected by state laws which preempt
the federal guidelines. In short, it is not resolved in
this section of HIPAA.

Example: We initialize the matrix: Dan is a doctor, file1 is a private record, Paula is the subject
of file1, Dan has permission own on file1, and Dan is
required by law to treat Paula. Dan, file1, Paula, and
health care provider group are all names for unique
integer values that index the matrix.
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The third query diverged for the 2000 model, but
a query which limited the exploration to a depth of
two rule invocations returned a false as expected. The
query for the 2003 version return true as expected.
We learned a number of lessons from our experiments.
First, following the structure and style of the law let
us discover a somewhat subtle policy property in query
2. We had expected that the result for the 2003 version would be negative since the the paragraph about
entities required by law to provide health care was removed. However, since the 2003 version is silent on the
need to respect optional consent, our query found an
ambiguity in the legal text that requires deeper legal
analysis to resolve.
Second, we can discover properties of the system
based on the presence or absence of permissions or environmental flags in the model. For some concerns, an
assertion that no command includes a particular obligation is sufficient as in our first query.
Third, we have indication that our current model
may suffer from an undecidability property noted by
HRU. The original HRU paper [30] proved that the
general question of safety, whether granting a general
right to one principal can eventually lead to it being
leaked to an unauthorized principal, for systems described in their syntax is undecidable. They note that
certain systems may not be subject to their conclusion,
but we have not yet explored that question for our system. We will consider ways of modifying our model or
queries to further explore this problem.
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guage (EPAL) [5], the Platform for Privacy Preferences
(P3P) [42], XACL [29], UCON [37], Cassandra [13], or
Fischer-Hübner and Ott’s formalization [22], however
we did not find the necessity. We give detailed reasoning for two models that are close to our own: EPAL
and Cassandra.
EPAL [5, 7] allows the writing of rule based policies
that include obligations, similar to our model. Policies
consist of two documents: (1) a vocabulary document
which contains principals, purposes, actions, “data”
(i.e. information that the policy discusses), and obligations and (2) a policy document that contains rules
that give approved (or disapproved) combinations of
vocabulary terms and conditions that can inspect flags
and parameters provided in a special invocation “container” and return boolean values. Policies are queried
for a ruling and, like our model, can return true or false
with an optional inclusion of obligations. There has
been extensive work on the formal semantics of EPAL
[6], policy composition [9, 11] and comparison [10], and
translation to other languages [33, 8]. As a study of
the power of EPAL, Powers, et al.translate a section of
Ontario’s Freedom of Information an Protection of Privacy Act [36] to EPAL [40]. As with our model, their
resulting policy closely mirrors the legal text, having
one rule per textual paragraph. They show how the
policy allows them to process a request and return a
ruling in a similar manner to how a human would, but
do not analyze or verify their policy formulation.
Certain properties of EPAL’s rules, conditions, system model, and vocabularies, however, made it difficult
for us to use. Rules do not have an explicit representation of access to system and object state, so rules
that inspect the state of objects and rights or modify
state (e.g. data anonymization, disclosure of minimum
necessary information, etc.) must rely on complex conditions and obligations. They also do not include a parameter for “recipient,” so rules that depend on the information recipient can not be written easily. They also
can not query or invoke other rules, so they can not collaborate or query each other for rulings or obligations.
Conditions can not access rule invocation parameters
such as purpose, actor, and data. They are confined to
flags and parameters included in a “container.” There
also is no provision for writing to or inspecting a system
log. Vocabularies include functionality for hierarchies
of principals, data, and purposes (but not actions) and
rule priorities, functionality that we did not need.
We could perhaps have used EPAL by devising
larger sets of conditions, obligations, containers, and
rules, but we find our representation more scalable for
legal texts. In particular, since EPAL has no structure for rules referring each other, the size of an EPAL

Related Work

Access control systems research has been extensively
researched for decades. Recent work on formalizations of access control systems and privacy rules include Anderson’s [3] principals for the design of a national patient information database, Bertino, et al.’s
formal model for policy features and comparison [15],
Fischer-Hübner and Ott’s formalization of the Generalized Framework for Access Control [22], Yu, et al.’s
formal semantics [45] for P3P [42], Jajodia et al.’s work
on provisional authorizations [32] which underly the
XML access control language XACL [29], and Wijesekera and Jajodia’s propositional policy model and
algebra [44, 43].
The formalization and analysis in this work uses
a classic access control model to achieve its goals.
We chose HRU syntax to begin from the ground up,
adding only exactly what is necessary. We could perhaps have used any of a long list of more modern systems such the Enterprise Privacy Authorization Lan9

rule set would grow exponentially with the number of
references in the legal text.
In the early 2000’s, the British government produced a set of documents describing how its Integrated
Care Records Service should work, including an output
based specification (OBS) [34]. Becker and Sewell use
their Cassandra trust management language to model
the OBS’ rules for the national data Spine [14]. Cassandra is a Datalog and credential based access control
language. It provides rules for performing actions, activating roles, deactivating roles, requesting credentials,
and submitting credentials over a distributed computing environment.
Cassandra differs from this work in several ways.
First, since Cassandra is concerned with trust management, it does not address the flow of objects in
the system, an important concern in our model. Conversely, since we are concerned with permissions and
object distribution, we provide only rudimentary support for roles in the form of groups. This difference of
focus reflects a difference in legal policy design. While
the UK’s law uses roles and credentials extensively, the
US’ health and financial privacy laws do not. Additionally, we desire the smallest set of features that
will accomplish our modelling goal. Cassandra, for instance, includes a credential distribution system, significantly more than is needed here. Finally, they are
concerned with implementing policy specifications as
given and thereby showing the sufficiency and flexibility of their language, not investigating policy permissiveness or performing policy comparison using queries
and invariants.
Earp et al. [21] provide a framework for comparing
web site privacy policies from different perspectives.
Their framework could be used to compare the provisions in different versions of privacy regulations as
well.
Breaux and Antón [17] analyze one of the HIPAA
fact sheet summaries [35] to find patterns and semantics of rights, obligations, rules, and constraints in natural language privacy regulations. They use a formal
semantic language KTL to model and query simple references. Our work differs in its focus on the implementation and modelling of an intricate legal source,
rather than the extraction of semantic patterns. Our
technique let us to discover omissions in the law, but
it is unclear if KTL can do so too.
Barth, et al. [12] present a theoretical model of
privacy policies with respect to contextual integrity.
Their theoretical model is limited to the passing of
messages between agents, ignoring action and purpose,
but they present theorems for checking future satisfiability of policy obligations. They give several short

examples from legal privacy policies, including GLB,
HIPAA, and the Childrens Online Privacy Protection
Act (www.coppa.org).
There has been extensive work on the formalization
of obligations in contexts including from businesses
processes [2] and contracts [1], access control policies [31, 37, 16], and enterprise privacy policies [19, 18].
Obligations in our model are handled rudimentarily
with flags and checks by policy rules. A full treatment of the classification, tracking, enforcement, and
management of the different types of obligations that
arise in privacy laws is beyond the scope of this paper.

7

Conclusions

Our work contributes in four important ways to the
formal analysis of legal privacy policies.
First, we define auditable privacy systems, a formalism for understanding the basic operations of legal privacy policies, and shown the minimum amount
of change required to implement them using classical
access control models.
Second, we have created a language suitable for
modelling legal privacy policies and developed a
methodology of translating natural language text to it.
Our method closely follows the structure of the text,
preserving references to other rules and environmental conditions. The payoff for this method comes from
preserving the subtleties of the law during modelling
and analysis. In translation, we reveal essential differences between the underlying policy frameworks of
HIPAA (and, from our readings, legal privacy policies
in general), and classical access control matrix based
systems.
Third, our model is designed to allow for users to
do policy evaluation by “executing the law.” This approach differs from the standard methods of inspection
and expert consultation by allowing non-experts to explore the rights and permissions of legal policies.
Finally, by observing a bridge between legal privacy
policies and formal analysis, we open the door for verification of more legal privacy rules. Our queries uncovered an unexpected ambiguity of the law, a feature
that some commenters on the 2000 law considered a
problem and a HIPAA expert saw as legally tricky. By
expanding the range and scope of our work in the future, we hope to open more legal policies to scrutiny.
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[8] Michael Backes, Markus Dürmuth, and Günter Karjoth. Unification in privacy policy evaluation - translating epal into prolog. In Fifth IEEE International
Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks (POLICY’04), 2004.
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Promela Basics

The following is a short primer to let the reader
understand the Promela code included in this work.
For a full tutorial see spinroot.com.
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They are closed by their names reversed (do/od if/fi).
Both structures select nondeterministically from a set
of options that begin with the :: symbol. The first
statement in an option is its guard, indicated by the
-> symbol which normally separates it from the other
statements in the option. If the guard is true or executable, the option may be selected by the structure.
If it is not, the option is excluded. The skip statement
is a no-op and is always executable.
Processes talk over named channels using listen (?)
and transmit (!). We use only synchronous channels in
our model, so a transmitting process blocks until there
is a process willing to listen and vice versa. Transmit
and listen commands are always executable. Channels
are typed by the kinds of messages that can be passed
over them. All the messages in our model have the
same pattern - mtype(bool) - where mtype is a message type (here request and response) and the body
is a boolean. A process can listen for a message that fits
particular parameters and when it accepts a message it
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on chan1 for messages of type request that contain
only one parameter (here t is a boolean) and assigns

[34] UK Department of Health. Output based specification
for Integrated Care Record Service. UK Crown Copyright, August 2003. Version 2.
[35] U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Fact
Sheet: Protecting the privacy of patients’ health information, 14 April 2003. www.hhs.gov/news/facts/
privacy.html.
[36] Government of Ontario. Freedom of information and
protection of privacy act. Revised Statues of Ontario
1990, Chapter F.31, 2005. www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/
DBLaws/Statutes/English/90f31 e.htm.
[37] Jaehong Park and Ravi Sandhu. The U CON ABC
usage control model. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur.,
7(1):128–174, 2004.
[38] European Parliament. Directive 95/46/ec on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data.
Official Journal of the European Communities L 281,
24 October 1995.
[39] European Parliament. Directive 2002/58/ec concerning the processing of personal data and the protection
of privacy in the electronic communications sector (directive on privacy and electronic communications). Official Journal of the European Communities L 201, 12
July 2002.

12

5. op = destroy principal p0 where p0 ∈ P , P 0 =
P − {p0 }, O0 = O − {p0 }, and M 0 [p, o] = M [p, o]
for all (p, o) ∈ P 0 × O0 , or

t the value of the boolean in the message. The special
write only variable accepts any type and is used for
throwaway values.
Promela does not have built in multi-dimensional
arrays, so we build a two dimensional array by creating
an array of records which themselves contain an array.
Each location in the array is a record with bit flags for
each potential permission. The result is a syntax like
this: m.mat[a].obj[f].own == 1 which refers to the
array location [a,f] in the array and assigns 1 to the
flag own there.
Like C’s ?: operator, Promela includes a three argument operator a->b:c where a is a boolean formula. If
a is true, b is the result of the operator. If a is false, c
is the result of the operator. For example, x = (true
-> 1 : 2) assigns x the value 1.

B

6. op = destroy object o0 where o0 ∈ O, P 0 = P ,
O0 = O − {o0 }, and M 0 [p, o] = M [p, o] for all
(p, o) ∈ P 0 × O0

C

Extra commands
Disclose command for [§164.506(c)(1), v.2003]

COM
if
and
then
and
and
end

Semantics of HRU model

Let r be a generic right from a finite set of generic
rights R. Let X0 , . . . , Xk be formal parameters to a
command. Let p, p1 , . . . , pn and o, o1 , . . . , om be integers between 1 and k. Let t be a text string.
The
operations
in
the
system
are:
enter r into (Xp , Xo ), delete r from (Xp , Xo ),
create principal
Xp ,
create object
Xo ,
destroy principal Xp , and destroy object Xo .
The configuration of the system is a tuple (P, O, M )
where P is the set of principals in the system, O is the
set of objects in the system (P ⊆ O), and M is the
access matrix.
A formal description of the effect of the primitive
operations on the system configuration is as follows.
Let (P, O, M ) and (P 0 , O0 , M 0 ) be configurations of the
op
system. A step (P, O, M ) −→ (P 0 , O0 , M 0 ) can occur if
either:

Disclose506c1 (a, s, r, p, f, ev)
AllowedAsIn506c1 (a, s, r, p, f, ev)
own in (a, f)
CopyObject(a, s, f, f0 )
enter own in (r, f0 )
EnterDisclose(a, p, f)

Helper commands:

1. op = enter r into (p, o) and P 0 = P , O0 = O, p ∈
P , o ∈ O, M 0 [p1 , o1 ] = M [p1 , o1 ] if (p1 , o1 ) 6= (p, o)
and M 0 [p, o] = M [p, o] ∪ {r}, or
2. op = delete r from (p, o) and P 0 = P , O0 = O,
p ∈ P , o ∈ O, M 0 [p1 , o1 ] = M [p1 , o1 ] if (p1 , o1 ) 6=
(p, o) and M 0 [p, o] = M [p, o] − {r}, or

COM
if
then
if
then
if
then
and
end

EnterUse(a, p, f)
“treatment” in p
enter treat in (a, f)
“payment” in purpose
enter pay in (a, f)
“healthcare operations” in p
enter healthops in (a, f)
return

COM
if
then
if
then
if
then
and
end

EnterDisclose(a, p, f)
“treatment” in p
enter treatDisclose in (a, f)
“payment” in p
enter payDisclose in (a, f)
“healthcare operations” in p
enter healthopsDisclose in (a, f)
return

IF
if
or
or
then
end

3. op = create principal p0 where p0 is a new symbol not in O, P 0 = P ∪ {p0 }, O0 = O ∪ {p0 },
M 0 [p, o] = M [p, o] for all (p, o) ∈ P ×O, M 0 [p0 , o] =
∅ for all o ∈ O0 , and M 0 [p, p0 ] = ∅ for all p ∈ P 0 ,
or
4. op = create object o0 where o0 is a new symbol
not in O, P 0 = P , O0 = O∪{o0 }, M 0 [p, o] = M [p, o]
for all (p, o) ∈ P × O, and M 0 [p, o0 ] = ∅ for all
p ∈ P , or
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isTPO(p)
“treatment” in p
“payment” in p
“healthcare operations” in p
return true

